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Abstract 
 
While the current financial crisis is widely acknowledged to be global, surprisingly little attention has been 
paid to its effect on one of the largest players in the global economy. China has weathered the crisis 
extremely well, though its growth has slowed slightly. I will analyze this by looking at China’s purchases of 
debt, the Chinese holdings of debt in the United States and its growing holdings in Europe, and the policy 
decisions directing this. This shows an intriguing change in the policy decisions that led to China becoming 
such a large holder of American debt. China amassed its large holdings of debt from the United States by 
merit of the strong trade relationship between the two countries, as well as the stability of the U.S. dollar. 
However, China’s interest in buying up Italian debt and forming stronger bonds with other Eurozone and 
European countries seems to speak to a different motive. Rather than allowing its reserves of foreign capital 
to grow over time, as it did with its U.S. debt, China is making a more aggressive move in this case. Thanks 
to its relative stability during the crisis, I believe this shows us that China is seeking to both ensure the 
continued security of its economic growth and increase its economic influence, thus using the instability of 
the global financial crisis to kill two birds with one stone.  
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The financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent 
global economic downturn has affected numerous 
countries across the globe, yet surprisingly little 
attention has been paid to one of the largest players in 
the world economy. China has weathered the crisis 
better than most other nations, only suffering from a 
slight decrease in gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth. In stark contrast, the crisis has thrown many 
European economies into turmoil.  Some European 
countries have called upon China to aid in their 
economic recovery, and China has displayed interest in 
purchasing European sovereign debt. I will analyze 
what might cause China to intervene in Europe and why 
this sets a different precedent for Chinese foreign policy 
by discussing China‟s potential purchases of debt, 
comparing Chinese holdings of United States 
government debt to China‟s growing European 
holdings, and evaluating the policy decisions directing 
these outcomes. China is actively seeking to purchase 
European debt and invest in the recovery of Europe in 
order to ensure the continued security of China‟s 
economic growth and global economic influence, 
effectively using the instability of the global financial 
crisis to kill two birds with one stone. 
China‟s leverage in the global economy 
emerges from the nation‟s status as both a major 
exporter and buyer of foreign debt. Because China runs 
a trade surplus with other countries, it accumulates 
large amounts of foreign currencies from transactions 
and invests these reserves in foreign bonds and 
government debt. This trade surplus enables China to 
use a large percentage of its newly accrued foreign 
reserves each year to purchase American treasury bonds 
and other dollar assets in order to maintain exchange 
rate stability against the dollar. With the American trade 
deficit to China reaching $252 billion in 2010—lower 
than the $282 billion deficit in 2008—China was able 
to add to its foreign reserves.1 China has total reserves 
of $3.2 trillion, the most of any country in the world. Of 
those reserves, around 70 percent are held in US dollar-
denominated assets2 and only a quarter of China‟s 
reserves are Euro-denominated assets, 3 even though the 
United States and Eurozone have similarly sized 
economies (GDP in 2010 of $14.6 trillion and $12.2 
trillion, respectively).4 
Even with rapidly decreasing investor confidence 
in Eurozone countries‟ debt, China is now showing 
interest in intervening in European sovereign debt 
markets. Zhang Xiaoqiang, the vice chairman of 
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China's top economic planning agency, the National 
Development and Reform Commission, says that China 
is willing to buy foreign capital within its capacity.5 
China possesses 30 percent of the world‟s total reserve 
holdings, demonstrating the vastness of its ability to 
purchase and stockpile foreign reserves. Still, the 
reason for China‟s interest in European debt is unclear 
because of the risks involved.  
The European sovereign debt crisis erupted in 
2010 and has been characterized by the rapid growth of 
debt in several European countries.6 Eurozone debt as a 
percentage of GDP declined overall during the period 
of 1990 to 2007, but the debt has jumped from 66.3 
percent of GDP to 85.3 percent across the Eurozone, 
since 2007.7 Some countries experienced even harsher 
changes, such as Greece, whose debt as a percentage of 
GDP ballooned to 142.8 percent, necessitating massive 
bail-outs from Eurozone nations and the IMF.  In 
conjunction with Ireland, whose slight 2006 budget 
surplus reversed into a deficit in 2010 and 2011, Italy‟s 
debt as a percentage of GDP has also grown immensely, 
and currently ranks behind only Greece in the 
Eurozone. As a result, debt ratings in many European 
countries have been downgraded by Moody‟s and 
Standard & Poor‟s.8 The ever-increasing deficits and 
government debts have created a spiral effect, 
decreasing investor confidence in Eurozone 
governments‟ ability to pay back their debts, thus 
increasing the cost of borrowing, and making 
investment in these countries even more risky. 
Yet China continues to pursue investment in 
those countries entangled in the European debt crisis. 
Overtures have been made to Ireland, whose President 
Mary McAleese met with Chinese officials in 
September 2011 to deepen cooperation between the two 
countries.9 Ireland has also welcomed Chinese direct 
investment as a way to aid economic recovery.10 
Greece, with its massive government debt, has also 
been the recipient of Chinese investment. In October 
2011, China and Greece agreed to a 35-year deal that 
allows China to operate Greece's main port.11 China has 
also agreed upon terms to upgrade Greece‟s marine 
fleet.12 These investments have provided China with the 
economic foothold in Greece to continue with future 
investments in infrastructure, tourism, and construction. 
There has also been speculation that China will increase 
its involvement with Italy as well.13 Italy has appealed 
to China for an economic lifeline, hosting 
representatives from the China Investment Corporation, 
a state-owned global investment fund, in September 
2011. Reports that China might purchase Italian bonds 
were also enough to lift the value of European shares 
and briefly increase investor confidence in European 
debt.14 In particular, China‟s presence in these 
countries‟ economies and debt markets provides 
credibility to Ireland, Greece, and Spain among 
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international investors and businesses. 
 These purchases and investments point to a 
change in Chinese economic policy, and suggest the 
importance of international trade to China‟s economic 
development. According to Susan Shirk, author of 
China: Fragile Superpower, foreign trade comprised 75 
percent of China‟s GDP in 2007. Thus, the Chinese 
economy is left vulnerable to shifts in the international 
economy, despite the country‟s tendency toward 
cautiousness when formulating foreign policy 
decisions. “If a backlash against China were to shut it 
out of key markets,” says Shirk, “economic growth 
would slow and domestic unemployment could rise to 
dangerous levels.”15 Therefore, Chinese politicians have 
traditionally tried to avoid backlash, a risk that may 
endanger the Chinese economy. Nonetheless, China‟s 
current interest in purchasing risky European debt is a 
much less cautious strategy, given the nation‟s 
customary approach to the international economy.   
 These policies suggest that China is reacting to 
external economic pressures in a novel way. China is 
using its immense reserves to increase its economic 
influence in Europe and ensure continued Chinese 
economic growth domestically. The current Eurozone 
debt crisis has given China an opportunity to ensure 
economic stability for itself and increase its presence in 
Europe. Before the financial crisis, China‟s trade with 
the European Union had been increasing, and China is 
now the European Union‟s second biggest trading 
partner.16 With the majority of China‟s economy based 
on foreign rather than domestic consumption, a 
continued slump in the market of one of the largest 
consumers of Chinese goods could stall growth in 
China and lead to unemployment.17 Wen Jiabao, the 
current Chinese Premier, stated in a conversation with 
European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso 
that the EU‟s economic stability is important to the 
stability of the world economy.18 Jiabao went on to state 
that China could best aid in the global recovery by 
ensuring its own growth.19 Because China‟s stability 
depends on the global economy, China has a direct 
stake in the outcomes of the European debt crisis.  
 China also has other motives in purchasing 
European sovereign debt. China has a special interest in 
having its World Trade Organization (WTO) status 
redefined by the European Union as soon as possible.20 
China currently is not recognized as a full market 
economy by the European Union, which allows the EU 
to place restrictions on Chinese products. For example, 
the prices of Chinese products are often inflated on the 
grounds that China is attempting to practice “dumping,” 
or selling products at artificially low prices. China is 
scheduled to be recognized as a market economy by all 
WTO members in 2014 and over eighty countries 
already recognize China as a market economy; 
however, Japan and the U.S. currently do not, allowing 
these two major importers to place restrictions on 
Chinese exports as well.21 Should the Chinese purchase 
European debt and provide stability, China could have 
additional leverage to ensure EU recognition of its 
status as a full market economy. This would cause a 
shift in China‟s bargaining position, which might 
prevent other economic powers from using China‟s 
nonmarket status to create more favorable trade 
agreements.22  
 Both of these two explanations suggest that China 
is becoming more assertive in an attempt to ensure its 
interests abroad. The current economic crisis has thus 
far been unable to stall the growth of the Chinese 
economy; however, the Chinese economy could be 
rendered extremely vulnerable if the crisis continues. 
Because of China‟s exposure to foreign economic 
trouble, the crisis‟s magnitude has forced China to 
change its strategy of making cautious economic 
decisions when dealing with other countries. Because 
the current European debt crisis is threatening China‟s 
ability to export to foreign markets, China has been 
increasingly willing to intervene in many of the 
countries the crisis has affected the most. By buying 
European debt and investing in European countries, 
China has ensured a foundation for future access into 
the large European market and has also attempted to 
avert immediate domestic instability by helping the 
global economy avoid future meltdowns. 
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